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PLATFORM PLEADING: ANALYZING EMPLOYMENT 
DISPUTES IN THE TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 
Joseph A. Seiner* 
Abstract: The technology sector has created thousands of new jobs for workers across the 
country in an emerging multi-billion dollar industry. Many companies in this platform-based 
sector are attempting to characterize their workers as independent contractors rather than 
employees, thus stripping them of both federal and state workplace protections—including the 
right to bargain collectively, receive fair compensation, and avoid discrimination. The federal 
courts, which have always grappled with the question of worker classification, are now 
struggling to define employment with respect to these gig sector jobs. The result has been 
scattered court decisions with inconsistent and conflicting analyses. 
This Essay seeks to provide the courts with much needed guidance on the question of 
worker classification in the technology sector at the pleading stage of a case. This Essay 
performs a review of the recent cases that have addressed this issue, synthesizing the varied 
analyses of these decisions. Navigating the reasoning used by the courts, as well as the 
Supreme Court’s evolving pleading precedent, this Essay proposes a new analytical framework 
for addressing the question of worker classification for technology sector claims. The model 
proposed by this Essay will assist the courts and litigants in better evaluating whether an 
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Better never means better for everyone . . . . It always means 
worse, for some.1 
—The Commander, The Handmaid’s Tale 
INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the so-called gig economy in the technology sector has 
created an expansive new industry that has generated billions of dollars 
and thousands of new employment opportunities. The sector has been 
described as offering “dream” jobs, providing workers the opportunity for 
“setting their own hours, working from home, [and] being their own 
bosses.”2 The sector has seen tremendous growth, as over 15% of the 
workforce now finds their employment tied to the technology sector.3 The 
gig economy has generated enormous excitement, numerous jobs and 
                                                     
1. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE 211 (First Anchor Books 1998) (1986). 
2. Andy Sullivan, Here’s How to Prepare for Your Financial Future if You Work in the Gig 
Economy, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/gig-economy-how-to-
achieve-financial-wellness-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/33G9-2QJA]. 
3. Id.; see also Ben Casselman, Maybe the Gig Economy Isn’t Reshaping Work After All, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/business/economy/ 
work-gig-economy.html [https://perma.cc/W22C-JC2V]. 
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substantial prosperity. While this new sector has created vast new 
opportunities for employment, these jobs—when compared with more 
traditional work—have not been “better for everyone” and have indeed 
been undeniably “worse, for some.”4 
The primary hurdle facing many of these workers has been the loss of 
their employment status. Many gig sector companies have attempted to 
characterize their workers as independent contractors rather than 
employees, thus depriving them of most state and federal employment 
protections.5 Efforts to characterize workers in this way are not surprising, 
as recent estimates show that companies spend far less on workers who 
lack true employment status.6 
Independent contractors lack the protections afforded most employees 
under federal and state law including wage, hour, and overtime 
provisions, and anti-discrimination protections.7 But despite the 
significance of a worker’s classification, the courts have struggled for 
decades to clearly define employment status.8 The gig economy has only 
added an additional layer of complexity to this issue. Employment laws 
in this country were written at a time that pre-dated not only platform-
based workers, but the internet as well.9 The courts have thus struggled to 
apply these laws to the more modern workers found in the gig economy.10 
                                                     
4. ATWOOD, supra note 1, at 211.  
5. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (addressing 
the question of worker employment status). 
6. See Noam Scheiber, Gig Economy Business Model Dealt a Blow in California Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/business/economy/gig-economy-
ruling.html [https://perma.cc/UTQ3-HF9Y] (“[C]lassifying drivers and other gig workers as 
employees tends to cost 20 to 30 percent more than classifying them as contractors.”). 
7. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) provisions only protect employees); Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 
F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006) (addressing employment status and FLSA issues); Lerohl v. Friends of 
Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that both Title VII and the ADA protect 
employees but not independent contractors); Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1091–
92 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Of primary significance, Grubhub did not control the manner or means of [the 
plaintiff’s] work, including whether he worked at all or for how long or how often, or even whether 
he performed deliveries for Grubhub’s competitors at the same time he had agreed to deliver for 
Grubhub.”); Sill v. AVSX Techs., LLC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 664, 670 (D.S.C. 2017) (“Only an employee 
may recover under the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act and FLSA.”). 
8. See infra Part IV (discussing tests for determining existence of employment relationship); see 
generally Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How 
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 340 (2001) (“For modern employment 
law purposes, control is an indistinct cloud that may or may not cross a vague line set arbitrarily by a 
judge or agency as the boundary of employee status.”). 
9. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 340; infra Part IV.  
10. See infra Part IV (discussing the application of the plausibility standard to technology sector 
workers). 
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The uncertainty in this area has resulted in widespread litigation by 
platform-based workers claiming employment law violations.11 This 
multi-billion-dollar industry has already seen numerous individual and 
class-action employment claims brought on the basis of different 
workplace laws, including wage, hour and overtime violations.12 
The courts have struggled to properly analyze many of these claims.13 
While analyzing these workplace claims is difficult enough, the Supreme 
Court added an additional layer of complexity with the plausibility 
pleading standard created in its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly14 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.15 These cases overturned decades of 
pleading precedent by adopting a new requirement that plaintiffs must 
allege enough facts in the complaint to set forth a plausible claim.16 This 
new plausibility standard has generated substantial confusion over which 
specific facts are necessary to include in a complaint, particularly for those 
cases brought in the employment context.17 The plausibility standard has had 
a negative impact on plaintiffs in the civil rights and workplace fields, and 
employment litigants have struggled to satisfy this test in the lower courts.18 
The combination of the new gig sector worker with the overall 
difficulty of applying both employment laws generally and the Supreme 
Court pleading standard have left many lower courts confused. As one 
federal court judge eloquently stated, resolving the question of who is an 
employee in the platform economy is like being “handed a square peg and 
asked to choose between two round holes.”19 The result of this confused 
area of the law has been varied reasoning in scattered opinions, and the 
                                                     
11. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Tailoring Class Actions to the On-Demand Economy, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 21 (2017) [hereinafter Seiner, Tailoring Class Actions] (discussing numerous cases advancing 
litigation on employment-related issues in the technology sector). 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). 
15. 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
16. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556–57 (2007). 
17. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179 (2010) [hereinafter 
Seiner, After Iqbal]. 
18. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing Iqbal’s impact on civil cases); Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil 
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (considering changes 
which have made it more difficult for discrimination claimants to bring claims); see generally Joseph 
A. Seiner, Plausibility & Disparate Impact, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2012) [hereinafter Seiner, 
Plausibility & Disparate Impact]; A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive 
Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment 
Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010). 
19. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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courts have faced tremendous difficulty in developing a consistent body 
of case law. The courts (and litigants) are simply unsure what it takes to 
sufficiently plead a workplace violation in the platform economy.20 
This Essay takes some of the guesswork out of litigation in the 
technology sector. This Essay performs a review of many of the recent 
published federal court decisions on the question of employment status in 
the technology sector. More specifically, this Essay examines how the 
courts have addressed motions to dismiss brought by platform sector 
employers on this question. This issue has not been fully addressed by the 
federal appellate courts—at least not in the technology sector—and thus 
the review performed here looks primarily to federal district court 
decisions. This function of the Essay is both descriptive and normative, 
and this Essay closely details the analysis used by the courts when 
evaluating—at the pleading stage of the case—the existence of an 
employment relationship in the technology sector.21 
Simply reporting the results of how the federal courts have ruled on 
which technology sector workers are considered employees does provide 
worthwhile information in this emerging field. Beyond performing this 
reporting mechanism, however, this Essay takes the next broad step. It 
synthesizes these decisions, concluding that the federal courts have 
largely treated cases involving platform-based workers in one 
of  three  ways.22 
First, some courts have concluded that the worker in the case has failed 
to allege sufficient facts in the complaint to establish an employment 
relationship with the technology sector employer. These courts have 
tended to apply a more heightened, rigid version of the Supreme Court’s 
plausibility standard to the claim in the case.23 Second, a number of courts 
have taken a contrary approach and concluded that the facts presented by 
the plaintiff in the complaint are sufficient to create at least a factual 
question on the issue of employment, and the courts have therefore 
allowed the case to proceed to discovery. These courts have been more 
flexible in their approach to pleading and view the question of 
employment status as one that is more appropriate for resolution at a later 
stage of the litigation.24 Finally, some courts have avoided the question 
                                                     
20. See infra sections IV.A–IV.C (discussing different approaches of federal courts to technology 
sector workplace claims). 
21. See infra Part IV (summarizing federal district court decisions). 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra section IV.A (addressing rigid application of plausibility standard). 
24. See infra section IV.B (discussing more flexible approach by courts to applying 
plausibility  test). 
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altogether. These courts have either sidestepped resolving the 
employment question or have decided the matter on other grounds.25 
What is remarkable about a close examination of these cases is that the 
vast majority of them arise in one particular subset of the technology 
sector—ridesharing, platform-based companies.26 Given the widespread 
press coverage and publicity the litigation in this area has received, it is 
not surprising to find many published decisions in this field.27 Many of 
these include a similar set of facts with respect to the workers and 
employers involved. Despite sharing these common facts, the courts have 
been unable to agree on the correct way to approach these claims. Rather, 
they have analyzed the cases in one of the three very different ways 
outlined above.28 This uncertainty will only create further litigation in this 
area, as there is no common set of ground rules as to how these cases 
should be addressed. 
This Essay attempts to establish these ground rules. Indeed, this Essay 
sets forth a proposed pleading standard for gig sector workers to 
sufficiently establish the existence of an employment relationship in the 
case. With the technology sector specifically in mind, this Essay suggests 
a model framework that the courts can use to properly analyze any claim 
in this area.29 Looking to the federal court decisions already existing in 
the field as well as the Supreme Court’s plausibility pleading standard, the 
framework proposed here establishes a six-part test that can be used to 
determine whether sufficient facts have been alleged by a technology 
sector worker to create this employment relationship. This test focuses 
heavily on the element of control which has been required by the courts 
and is found in the common law.30 However, by integrating the flexibility 
inherent of most work in the technology sector, the proposed model 
considers this control requirement from the standpoint of this new and still 
emerging economy. 
The model proposed by this Essay has a number of important 
implications.31 The confusion and uncertainty found in this field has 
                                                     
25. See infra section IV.C (discussing how some federal courts have avoided employment 
questions raised in technology-sector cases). 
26. See generally Part IV (summarizing technology sector cases). 
27. See generally Casselman, supra note 3; Faiz Siddiqui, New York Considering Setting Minimum 
Wage for Uber, Lyft Drivers, WASH. POST (July 2, 2018), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/07/02/new-york-considering-setting-minimum-
wage-for-uber-lyft-drivers/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2019, 5:22 PM). 
28. See id. 
29. See infra Part V (preparing model framework to consider workplace disputes arising in 
technology sector cases). 
30. See infra Part V. 
31. See infra Part VI (discussing implications of analytical framework suggested in this Essay). 
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caused widespread frustration on the question of employment in the 
technology sector.32 While no test can capture all factual possibilities of 
gig sector employment, the model proposed here can be used by the 
majority of courts as a general framework to evaluate a platform sector 
case. Similarly, both defendants and plaintiffs will have much clearer 
guidance on what should be alleged in the technology sector with respect 
to the employment relationship.33 By creating more certainty in this area, 
the complaints will be more precise and the claims themselves will be 
more clearly framed. Indeed, where there is more certainty in the law, 
there is a greater likelihood of settlement and reduced overall litigation.34 
This type of judicial efficiency is sorely needed in the technology sector, 
which has faced a tremendous amount of overall litigation.35 
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part II, this Essay navigates the 
history of pleading laws in this country. The Essay explains the 
development of the pleading rules over time and explores the role of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Part details the importance of the 
notice pleading standard created by these rules. Part III of this Essay 
further explores the development of the Supreme Court’s plausibility 
standard. This Part explains how this new test overturned decades of 
pleading precedent and created substantial confusion in the lower courts. 
Part IV of this Essay reviews the current case law in this area. This Part 
synthesizes these decisions, explaining the three different approaches the 
federal district courts have taken on the question of employment in the 
technology sector. Some courts have applied a heightened pleading 
standard, some courts have taken a much more relaxed approach, and 
others have simply avoided the question altogether. Part V of this Essay 
proposes a model pleading standard for evaluating whether an 
employment relationship has been properly alleged in a complaint brought 
by a workplace plaintiff in the technology sector. The test proposed here 
navigates the difficult question of defining employment, the intricacies of 
                                                     
32. See Jeffrey Hirsch & Joseph Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1727, 1729 (2017) (“Workers in the on-demand technology sector represent a new breed of 
employees, and courts are still struggling to define this hybrid working relationship. While the law 
grapples with the rights that should be afforded to these workers, many employee protections are 
simply falling through the cracks.”). 
33. See id. 
34. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: 
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 136 (2006) [hereinafter Seiner, 
Disentangling Disparate Impact] (“[A]ll parties should benefit in the long term [from less confusion] 
as greater certainty in the legal process leads to reduced litigation costs.” (citing Richard B. Stewart, 
The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 655, 662 (1985))). 
35. Indeed, greater certainty in the law can even reduce potential barriers for technology sector 
start-ups. The current confusion created by state and federal employment laws can create serious 
hurdles for potential businesses attempting to enter the technology industry. 
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the platform-based workplace, and the Supreme Court’s plausibility 
pleading standard. Part VI discusses the implications of the analytical 
framework proposed in this Essay. This Part notes some of the efficiencies 
that the proposed framework would create, as well as the greater certainty 
that would be provided in a currently confused area of the law. This Part 
further addresses some of the possible concerns that could be raised by 
adopting the model proposed here. 
One thing is certain in defining technology sector employment: there is 
no such definition. This Essay provides much-needed guidance in this 
emerging area of the law. 
I. THE HISTORY OF PLEADING AND THE COMPLAINT 
While legal scholars typically view the federal rules in modern terms 
through the lens of modern cases, it can be instructive to take a step back 
and examine the pleading standards from a historical perspective. These 
rules have evolved over hundreds of years, and an understanding of the 
changes that have occurred over time is helpful when considering the 
proper tests that should be used.36 
While this Essay is not a historical piece, and thus cannot fully explore 
the fascinating and in-depth history of pleading rules in this country, both 
cultural and political developments played important roles in the creation 
of the rules that we have today. The procedural rules that we currently 
have in this country are borrowed heavily from English law.37 The English 
system contained inconsistencies in its rules between the courts of equity 
and courts of law.38 The system in England was complex and heavily 
favored the more sophisticated pleader, rather than the individual with the 
more meritorious claim.39 
In the United States, the pleading standards were quite different in the 
early courts of the colonies.40 To provide more clarity and consistency, 
                                                     
36. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of 
Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1111 (2010); see generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Discrimination Presumption, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115 (2019) [hereinafter Seiner, Discrimination Presumption] (discussing 
pleading rules in context of workplace cases). 
37. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1116; see generally Seiner, Discrimination 
Presumption, supra note 36.   
38. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (3d ed. 2005); Jack Ritchie, 
Flexible Interpretation of Rules of Court to Suit Circumstances of a Particular Case, 24 TEX. L. REV. 
77 (1945); Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform, 57 COLUM. L. 
REV. 518, 520 (1957).  
39. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 38; Ritchie, supra note 38; Weinstein & Distler, supra 
note 38.  
40. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 97. 
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the state legislatures started adopting a code pleading system in the early 
1800s.41 Despite being designed as an attempt to streamline the pleading 
system, code pleading ultimately resulted in a “slow, expensive, and 
unworkable” process that required parties to be heavily inclusive in 
their  pleading.42 
The Field Code, adopted by New York in 1848 (and subsequently by 
numerous other states) did away with the distinction between law and 
equity.43 The result was to allow a simple type of suit, the civil action.44 
The Field Code also sought to be simpler than other systems, and to 
provide greater access to the courts.45 Nonetheless, over time, a strict 
application of the rules of the Field Code led to its downfall.46 
Numerous changes were made to both state and federal pleading rules 
during the subsequent decades.47 Congress sought to unify the pleading 
rules in the 1930s, and an Advisory Committee of practitioners and law 
professors (including Professor Charles E. Clark) worked through 
multiple early drafts of a uniform procedural system.48 The final version 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were put in place on September 
16, 1938.49 The rules rejected an overly fact-intensive pleading system, 
which could allow more sophisticated parties to prevail rather than those 
with the more meritorious claims.50 Perhaps the centerpiece of this 
approach was Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires 
only that a plaintiff give “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
                                                     
41. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1114. 
42. Id. (quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004)). 
43. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 293; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1115. 
44. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 293. 
45. Id. at 293–94, 1116 (quoting 1848 N.Y. Laws 521); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1115. 
46. Weinstein & Distler, supra note 38, at 520. 
47. Id. at 518–21; Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 353–54 (1987); see also 
Charles E. Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 HARV. L. 
REV. 1303, 1320 (1936); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1117; Stephen N. Subrin, Federal 
Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 
137 U. PENN. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (1989). 
48. Goodman, supra note 47, at 353–58; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1117; Michael E. 
Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 916 
(1976); cf. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit 
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (“[T]he few 
existing procedure histories suffer from too much reliance on the work of Charles Clark, one of the 
most influential early twentieth century reformers and an historian of code procedure. Clark’s reform 
ambitions skewed his historical work.”). 
49. Goodman, supra note 47, at 363–64; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1117. 
50. Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 105 (2011). 
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that the pleader is entitled to relief.”51 These rules provided for a "notice 
pleading" system, whereby providing the opponent with simple notice of 
the claim was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to proceed in the case.52 The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus finally provided a robust, uniform 
procedural system that favored parties proceeding to discovery in cases 
where the merits of individual claims could be better assessed.53 
Of course, this system was far from perfect and much criticism 
emerged with respect to this approach.54 In particular, defendants were 
often frustrated that the system seemed to favor plaintiffs, and that they 
were often forced to incur great expenses simply to evaluate the merit of 
a claim.55 
Despite the criticism, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure formed the 
basis of pleading claims in the federal system, which allowed for liberal 
discovery.56 In the decades following the adoption of these rules, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted and refined their meaning through 
numerous decisions.57 Perhaps the most well-known Supreme Court 
pleading decision came in Conley v. Gibson,58 an opinion issued in 1957.59 
In Conley, a group of black railway workers brought a class action 
against their union (and others) for failing to represent them on the basis 
of their race.60 In examining the pleadings, the Supreme Court concluded, 
in a now well-known statement, that “a complaint should not be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief.”61 The Court noted that the pleading requirements are designed 
to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
                                                     
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
52. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 257 (5th ed. 1999); GENE R. SHREVE & 
PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 229 (4th ed. 2009); Cavanagh, supra 
note 50, at 106; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1118; Weinstein & Distler, supra note 38, at 
522.  
53. Cavanagh, supra note 50, at 106; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1118; Smith, supra note 
48, at 918; Weinstein & Distler, supra note 38, at 523 (“[A] resulting general requirement that 
pleadings be sufficiently detailed to give the parties and court notice of the particular transactions 
relied upon and of the rule of law being invoked.”). 
54. Cavanagh, supra note 50, at 107. 
55. See id. 
56. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment 
and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 235–38 (2011). 
57. Id. 
58. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
59. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 36, at 1120. 
60. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42. 
61. Id. at 45–46. 
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grounds upon which it rests,” and “to facilitate a proper decision on the 
merits,” rather than favoring a particular party based on skillful 
pleading.62 The holding in Conley established the basis for the relaxed 
pleading standard for the next five decades. The decision largely stood for 
the proposition that liberal pleading standards and discovery 
should  govern. 
The Supreme Court has applied the Conley standard to varying contexts 
since. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,63 the Supreme Court provided its 
most recent guidance on the appropriate pleading standards for federal 
employment discrimination cases.64 In 2002, Swierkiewicz, a Hungarian 
immigrant, alleged that he had been demoted because of his age and 
national origin.65 While the lower courts rejected the complaint on the 
pleadings, the Supreme Court noted that plaintiffs should not be subjected 
to a heightened pleading standard and “need not plead a prima facie case 
of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss.”66 Establishing a prima 
facie case is not necessary under the pleading requirements as it creates 
an unnecessary burden on plaintiffs prior to discovery and because of the 
unique requirements found in employment discrimination claims.67 Thus, 
in a complaint, a discrimination plaintiff need not allege all of the prima 
facie requirements: “[that he belongs to] a protected class, that [he was] 
qualified for the position, that [he] suffered an adverse employment 
action, and that there is other evidence giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination.”68 
The Supreme Court precedent from Conley appeared to settle the 
pleading standards for civil cases—establishing a relatively low bar and 
liberal discovery rules. The Court’s decision in Swierkiewiez seemed to 
follow this trend, similarly creating a low pleading bar for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs. Decades of well-established pleading precedent 
would all change with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and the introduction of a plausibility 
requirement.69 
                                                     
62. Id. at 47–48. 
63. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
64. Id. at 508–09. 
65. Id. 
66. Seiner, After Iqbal, supra note 17, at 184–85 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–11). 
67. Id. (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–11). 
68. Id. at 185. 
69. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 444 (2007). Cf. 
Charles Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 
1621 (2011) (“The ultimate interplay between Twombly/Iqbal and Swierkiewicz remains to be finally 
resolved in the courts, or, perhaps, in Congress . . . .”). 
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II. THE RISE OF THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD 
In Twombly, the Supreme Court revisited years of settled pleading 
precedent. Twombly involved a complex antitrust case brought pursuant 
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.70 The plaintiffs alleged that certain 
telephone companies were engaging in inappropriate conduct that 
disfavored competition and that they had not properly competed outside 
of their markets.71 In considering the case, the Supreme Court abrogated 
Conley and the “no set of facts” standard, replacing it with a plausibility 
requirement.72 This new test “requires more than labels and conclusions, 
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.”73 More specifically, a complaint must include “enough facts to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and must “raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level.”74 While the Court stated that a 
plausible claim does “not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,” 
the standard has dramatically changed the pleading requirements with this 
new test.75 And this vague plausibility standard has left judges with 
substantial discretion when considering the sufficiency of the pleadings.76 
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court further refined the 
plausibility requirement, making clear that the new test would apply 
beyond the antitrust context. After the tragic events of September 11, 
2001, Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen, was detained as part of the 
subsequent investigations.77 After his detainment and conviction, Iqbal 
filed a claim against former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller.78 Iqbal’s complaint alleged that his detainment 
was the result of an “unconstitutional policy that subjected [him] to harsh 
conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national 
origin.”79 He further alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller both knew of and 
inappropriately agreed to subject him to those illegal conditions.80 
Applying the new pleading standard from Twombly, the Court 
concluded that Iqbal’s allegations had “not ‘nudged [his] claims’ of 
                                                     
70. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
71. Id. at 550–51. 
72. Id. at 557. 
73. Id. at 555. 
74. Id. at 570. 
75. Id. 
76. Brescia, supra note 56, at 238. 
77. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 669. 
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invidious discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.’”81 The Court found that the plaintiff's lack of facts and overly 
conclusory allegations “disentitle[d] [the allegations] to the presumption 
of truth.”82 In addition, the Court held that it was more likely that the facts 
supported nondiscriminatory, anti-terrorism activity rather than targeted, 
unlawful conduct.83 After ruling on the insufficiency of Iqbal’s complaint, 
the Court further rejected his legal arguments.84 First, the Court declined 
to limit the plausibility standard from Twombly to antitrust claims, and 
instead expressly held that the new test should apply to all civil actions.85 
Second, the Court refused to “relax the pleading requirements on the 
ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive 
discovery.”86 Finally, the Court rejected the claim that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure should allow for discriminatory intent to be alleged 
generally—sufficient factual support is required.87 Following Twombly 
and Iqbal, lower courts and plaintiffs would struggle with determining the 
facts necessary to plead a plausible civil claim. 
In the years following these decisions, the plausibility standard has 
seemed to favor defendants.88 While the standard may have provided 
some overall benefit in reducing legal costs and streamlining cases, it has 
also established a formidable barrier with respect to access to the courts 
and legal justice.89 
At a minimum, the plausibility standard has generated substantial 
confusion in the lower courts. And, some courts have applied the 
plausibility test in a way that has heightened the pleading requirements for 
plaintiffs,90 though there is certainly debate on this question91 and empirical 
                                                     
81. Id. at 680 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007). 
82. Id. at 681. 
83. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Out for Civil Rights and 
Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 723 (2012). 
84. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 686. 
87. Id. at 686–87.  
88. See Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html [https://perma.cc/2WVU-X3DT]. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (referring to 
“unresolved tension” in pleading cases); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To the 
extent that we perceive a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) in the two groups of cases, it is 
difficult to know in cases that come before us whether we should apply the more lenient or the more 
demanding standard.”); Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(discussing impact of Iqbal decision on circuit case law); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 
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studies are far from conclusive.92 Nonetheless, some studies suggest that there 
has been an overall negative impact for civil rights plaintiffs.93 
The creation and development of the plausibility standard also 
coincides with the expanding platform economy94 over the past several 
years.95 As discussed in greater detail below, the courts have had difficulty 
applying this standard,96 and, more specifically, defining “employment” 
with respect to technology workers.97 
                                                     
403 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts are “still struggling” with application of plausibility 
standard). 
92. See generally William H.J. Hubbard, The Empirical Effects of Twombly and Iqbal (Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 773, 2016), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2479&context=law_and_economi
cs [https://perma.cc/6588-DCJ2] (summarizing studies). 
93. Malveaux, supra note 83, at 719, 728–31; see also Brescia, supra note 56 (discussing housing 
cases); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010) 
(discussing impact of Twombly and Iqbal); Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles 
in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 623–31 (2011) (discussing procedural changes 
and impact on civil rights plaintiffs); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How 
Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (discussing Twombly and Iqbal and effect on civil rights plaintiffs). 
94. See generally Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work 
Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 22667, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22667.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV9L-Z5BY] (noting 
that percentage of workers with alternative work arrangements “rose from 10.7 percent in February 
2005 to 15.8 percent in late 2015”); cf. Diana Farrell & Fiona Greig, The Online Platform Economy: 
Has Growth Peaked?, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST. (Nov. 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.co
m/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-online-platform-econ-brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/57CJ-T8NZ]. 
95. See generally Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and 
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1635 (2017); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. 
REV. 87, 94 (2016). 
96. See Colleen McNamara, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical Study of District Court 
Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 424–25 (2011) (“At this early stage, it 
appears that Iqbal has only generated more confusion over pleading standards because it proposed a 
test that has been cited by less than half the circuits and has been rigorously applied by an even smaller 
fraction.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1299, 1311–13 (2010) 
(discussing problems with the plausibility standard); see generally Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 
F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010); Lonny Hoffman, Plausible Theory, Implausible Conclusions, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 143, 143 (2016) (“[T]rial courts struggle to consistently apply these unfamiliar 
steps at the pleading stage.”). 
97. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race 
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1311 (2017); Brishen Rogers, 
Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
479, 482 (2016); E. Gary Spitko, A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in the 
Platform Economy, 70 FLA. L. REV. 409, 427 (2018).  
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III. PLEADING AND THE PLATFORM ECONOMY 
Courts across the country have recently addressed the difficulty of 
applying the plausibility standard to technology-sector cases. The 
standard itself is in flux, as it is still in its early stages and being more 
fully discussed in the courts and academic literature.98 Applying this 
developing standard to a developing economy thus presents unique 
challenges.99 Indeed, the facts necessary to “sufficiently allege 
employment”100 for technology workers are unclear at best. And, as gig 
sector cases are now brought in courts across the country, jurisdictional 
differences are beginning to appear. 
In the workplace context, the contours of the employment relationship 
are perhaps the most critical issue currently being developed in the lower 
courts.101 Regardless of how the courts have approached this question, 
there is always a focus on the issue of control.102 To be considered an 
“employee” by the courts, employers must exert a sufficient amount of 
control over the worker.103 The resolution of the question of a worker’s 
                                                     
98. See infra sections IV.A–IV.C (discussing cases in this area). 
99. See David Weil, Lots of Employees Get Misclassified as Contractors. Here’s Why It Matters, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/lots-of-employees-get-misclassified-as-
contractors-heres-why-it-matters [https://perma.cc/6CBK-3VU7]; see generally Brookhaven Baptist 
Church v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Halvorson), 912 A.2d 770, 777 (Pa. 2006) (noting that 
“[c]ourts have struggled to define employment that is ‘casual in character’”); Dan Eaton, Gig 
Economy Creates Legal Puzzles for the Courts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2017), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/technology/sd-fi-labor-eaton-column-20170807-
story.html# [https://perma.cc/3KTH-VE4B] (“In place of uniform definitions, courts and regulators 
have adopted multi-part tests to distinguish” workers in the gig sector). 
100. Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2013). 
101. See Sill v. AVSX Techs., LLC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 664, 670 (D.S.C. 2017) (“Under South 
Carolina law, the question is whether the employer has the right to control the individual in the 
performance of work and the manner in which it is done.”); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. 
Supp. 3d 1133, 1148–49 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]he ‘principal test of an employment relationship is 
whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of 
accomplishing the result desired.’” (quoting Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 
522, 531 (2014))). 
102. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149 (analyzing the “principal” element under Borello, for 
instance, “whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and 
means of accomplishing the result desired”). 
103. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Control is only 
significant when it shows an individual exerts such a control over a meaningful part of the business 
that she stands as a separate economic entity.”); Roslov v. DirecTV Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 965, 974 
(E.D. Ark. 2016) (discussing worker status and control over profits); Thornton v. Mainline 
Commc’ns, LLC, 157 F. Supp. 3d 844, 849 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (“[Employers] exercised a high degree 
of control over the manner in which plaintiffs performed their installation and repair work.”); ; 
Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 42 (Cal. 2018) (finding that employees were 
improperly misclassified as independent contractors); O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1152 (“[H]irees 
who were ‘not required to work either at all or on any particular schedule’ were nonetheless held to 
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employment status is a threshold issue, and a worker who is not 
considered an employee will be protected by few, if any, of the state or 
federal employment laws.104 Where enough facts are alleged to suggest an 
employment relationship exists, however, the case will typically be 
permitted to proceed, absent any other potential shortcomings.105 
The question of employment status is unquestionably specific to 
individual jurisdictions and factual scenarios.106 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has provided some overarching guidance on how to 
approach this issue, emphasizing the element of control. In the seminal 
case, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,107 the Court outlined 
the elements to be considered for control, noting that the lower courts 
should apply common law agency principles as part of the analysis.108 
The Darden Court listed twelve discrete common law agency factors. 
As noted by the Darden Court, these agency factors include: 
the skill required [for the job]; the source of the instrumentalities 
and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship 
                                                     
be employees as a matter of law based on the amount of control the employer could exercise when 
those employees decided to turn up for work.” (quoting JKH Enters. Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 
142 Cal. App. 4th 1046, 1051 (2013))). 
104. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., 161 F.3d 299, 303–04 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(“Express had minimal control over its drivers”; the drivers’ “profit or loss [was] determined largely 
on his or her skill, initiative, ability to cut costs, and understanding of the courier business.”); Razak 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *54 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (dismissing the 
case given “‘that no single factor in the economic reality test is dispositive,’ Plaintiffs have not 
brought to the record sufficient proof to meet their burden of showing that they are employees” (citing 
Chao v. Mid-Atlantic Installation Servs., 16 F. App’x 104, 106 (4th Cir. 2001))); Hirsch & Seiner, 
supra note 32, at 1740 (“[I]ndependent contractors neither have a right to collective action or 
bargaining nor any protection against, among other things, discrimination and pay that would violate 
the minimum wage or overtime rules.”). 
105. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 983–85 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(finding employment relationship where employer controlled work hours and specifics of job 
performance); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (setting forth jury 
question on issue of whether workers are employees or independent contractors); O’Connor, 82 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1138 (“[O]nce a plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he provided services for an 
employer, the employee has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of 
employer/employee . . . . If the putative employee establishes a prima facie case (i.e., shows they 
provided services to the putative employer), the burden then shifts to the employer to prove, if it can, 
that the ‘presumed employee was an independent contractor.’” (quoting Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 
F.3d 895, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2010))). 
106. See, e.g., Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988–89 (examining question of employment relationship 
under California law). 
107. 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (“‘In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the 
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means 
by which the product is accomplished.’” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 751 (1989))). 
108. Id. 
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between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to 
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method 
of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.109 
These control factors set out in Darden have been applied in varying 
ways by the lower courts—dependent upon the facts of the case and the 
jurisdiction where the claim is brought.110 Moreover, the Darden test was 
developed at a time when brick-and-mortar companies were far more 
common than they are today.111 The technology sector has forced 
employers and the courts to reconceptualize what the employment 
relationship means, and non-traditional type relationships are now far 
more common.112 
The question of who is an employee in the technology sector is 
relatively new to the academic literature, and there has been little research 
synthesizing the law on this question.113 Indeed, only in recent years have 
we begun to see the cases emerge on this question in the federal courts 
and the analysis has largely been at the district court level.114 This Essay 
surveys much of this law, bringing together the many federal district court 
decisions on this question. This Essay thus examines how the courts have 
ruled at the pleading stage of a case on the question of who an employee 
in the technology sector is. This Essay synthesizes those decisions, 
                                                     
109. Id. at 323–24 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)). 
110. Cf. Carlson, supra note 8, at 338–39 (“Employer control over the details of the work has been 
the factor most courts place at the heart of any test of worker status . . . . Indeed, one could argue that 
nearly all the other factors listed by courts are merely different ways of evidencing the employer’s 
means of control.”). 
111. Id. 
112. See Abha Bhattarai, Now Hiring, for a One-Day Job: The Gig Economy Hits Retail, WASH. 
POST (May 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/now-hiring-for-a-one-
day-job-the-gig-economy-hits-retail/2018/05/04/2bebdd3c-4257-11e8-ad8f-
27a8c409298b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e653cb6902c1  [https://perma.cc/Q5JX-
TN6C] (“The rise in gig work comes as state legislatures across the country are considering bills that 
would legally classify gig workers as independent contractors, stripping them of a number of 
workplace rights and protections. Until now, the distinction between on-demand employee and 
contractor has been largely unclear, as evidenced by a number of lawsuits alleging that companies 
such as Uber, Grubhub and Handy are incorrectly classifying their workers as independent 
contractors.”). 
113. See generally Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016) (discussing meaning of employment in the technology sector). 
114. See infra sections IV.A–IV.C (examining how federal courts have addressed question of 
employment status in technology sector).  
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evaluating how the courts have approached this question. Ultimately, this 
Essay seeks to navigate these cases, providing guidance on the 
information that must be pled to survive dismissal of an employment 
claim in the technology sector. 
After reviewing the cases in this area, this Essay concludes that the 
federal district courts tend to address dismissal motions in platform-based 
employment cases in one of three different ways. This is a broad 
generalization, but one that is helpful in understanding how the courts 
have approached this new and complex question. 
Thus, by examining the courts’ recent decisions in gig sector 
employment disputes at the motion to dismiss stage, this Essay concludes 
that the courts have responded: (1) by finding the case to include 
insufficient facts and thus granting dismissal; (2) by concluding that the 
complaint contains sufficient factual allegations and thus allowing the 
matter to proceed; or (3) by sidestepping the question at this early stage 
of the analysis. This Essay first examines cases where the courts have 
found the complaint to contain insufficient facts to properly allege an 
employment relationship.115 This Essay then examines claims where the 
courts have concluded that workers have properly plead employment 
within the platform economy.116 Finally, this Essay examines cases in 
which courts have simply avoided the issue of sufficient technology 
sector  pleading.117 
The most high-profile decisions in this area have arisen in the 
ridesharing context. To be sure, there have been numerous gig sector cases 
in other areas of the on-demand economy, but decisions involving Uber 
and Lyft have attracted the most headlines.118 To simplify the discussion 
in this area, this Essay will look primarily at how the courts have 
approached this particular subset of technology sector cases, given that 
those cases have driven the law in this area.119 Nonetheless, this Essay 
                                                     
115. See infra section IV.A. 
116. See infra section IV.B. 
117. See infra section IV.C. 
118. See generally Judge Approves $27 Million Settlement in Lyft Driver Lawsuit, CNBC (Mar. 
17, 2017, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/judge-approves-27-million-driver-
settlement-in-lyft-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/4KM8-898K]; Tracey Lien, California Lawsuits 
Accuse Uber and Lyft of Discriminating Against Wheelchair Users, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-lyft-wheelchair-20180315-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6RWL-QUHZ]. 
119. Many of these claims arise in California, which applies analysis from S.G. Borello & Sons, 
Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). The “‘most significant’ consideration” 
when examining the existence of an employment relationship is the company’s “right to control work 
details.” Id. at 404. The test examines: (1) whether the individual performing work is engaged in a 
distinct occupation; (2) whether the work is done with or without supervision; (3) the skill required; 
(4) who provides the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work; (5) the amount of time the work is 
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seeks to be broad in scope, and to examine the more general question of 
the type of elements necessary to successfully plead any workplace case 
in the platform-based sector—regardless of the exact nature of the 
technology employer involved. 
A. Insufficient Pleadings 
The courts, generally, have been reluctant to dismiss platform-based 
cases early in the proceedings. Where the courts have rejected these claims, 
they have looked to contradictory statements, overly generalized allegations 
and insufficient factual detail in the complaint to explain the dismissal. 
For example, in Carter v. Rasier-CA, LLC120 the District Court for the 
Northern District of California granted ridesharing company Uber’s 
motion to dismiss with leave to amend in a case involving a driver because 
the court found that the plaintiff had not pled sufficient factual detail to 
support his employment status.121 The court rejected the complaint, 
holding that it was “insufficient, even at the motion to dismiss stage.” In 
dismissing the complaint, the court emphasized the lack of factual support 
in the pleadings: 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “employed Plaintiff as an 
employee,” . . . but offers minimal factual allegations to support 
this conclusion. He states that Uber sets the fare model and 
collects fares from users and . . . direct[s] drivers where to 
drive . . . . Plaintiff further alleges that Uber may terminate 
drivers or require them to take additional training if their “rating” 
falls below a certain level . . . . The Court finds this is insufficient, 
even at the motion to dismiss stage.122 
The court focused in on the question of control, holding that conclusory 
statements were insufficient to establish this element of employment.123 
The court further required “more factual detail” from the plaintiff to show 
how control was actually evidenced by the employer to establish a 
plausible claim.124 The court thus required that any amended complaint 
                                                     
performed; (6) the method of payment; (7) whether the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer; and (8) whether the parties believe they are creating an employment relationship. “[T]he 
individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their 
weight depends often on particular combinations.” Id. at 404. 
120. No. 17-cv-00003-HSG, 2017 WL 4098858, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2017). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at *2. 
123. Id. at *5. 
124. Id. at *2. 
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“clearly set forth each legal claim and the facts supporting such claims, 
including each defendant’s specific conduct, if he can do so truthfully.”125 
In Alatraqchi v. Uber Technologies, Inc.126 the District Court for the 
Northern District of California similarly granted the defendant’s dismissal 
motion (with leave to amend) because of the plaintiff’s failure to 
sufficiently plead his employment status.127 The court specifically found 
that the Uber driver in the case had not “adequately allege[d] an 
employment relationship with [the company].”128 The court similarly 
concluded that the facts did not support this relationship129 and that the 
plaintiff’s statements were inconsistent on this issue.130 
The court emphasized the plaintiff’s “inconsistent allegations”—for 
instance, that he was both an employee and also engaged in a “business 
relationship” with Uber.131 The court also raised concerns about the 
worker’s “several references to his ‘business arrangement,’ ‘business 
relationship,’ and/or ‘partnership’ with [the company].”132 The court did 
                                                     
125. Id. at *5. The court further stated, “Plaintiff’s allegations that Plaintiff is an employee and 
Defendant can control when and how drivers earn fares by sending User ride requests is a legal 
conclusion that the Court need not accept as true. Although a rating system may be evidence of 
Defendant’s control over Plaintiff’s day-to-day work, plaintiff must allege more factual detail about 
how this rating system regulates drivers’ activities to make the existence of an employment 
relationship plausible and not merely possible.” Id. at *2. 
126. No. C-13-03156 JSC, 2013 WL 4517756 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013). 
127. Id. at *5.  
128. Id. at *4. 
129. The pro se complaint appears inconsistent in places with respect to allegations of employment 
with Uber. Indeed, the complaint references the plaintiff’s “‘business relationship,’ and/or 
‘partnership’ with Uber.” Id. at *5 (“‘Plaintiff entered into the business arrangement with the 
Defendant believing this would be along [sic] term, mutually beneficial deal . . . I no longer have the 
job that I was working before starting with Uber, and declined several other offers believing that Uber 
was serious about a long term business relationship . . . I say again that I was used by Uber during the 
most busy night of the year while under the impression that this would be an ongoing business 
relationship . . . I was invited to become an Uber partner at the busiest time of the year . . . . I accepted 
this Uber partnership . . . I lost money believing that I had enough security in my future income 
through this partnership to make the investment in this new vehicle . . . I drove as a partner 
of  Uber . . . .’”). 
130. “Further, in recounting an interaction with a ‘customer’ who inquired as to why Plaintiff went 
to ‘work with Uber,’ Plaintiff alleges that he told the customer that “no I[sic] independent with myself, 
different company.” Plaintiff also states in his Complaint that ‘I am not an employee of Uber,’ 
although it is not clear if Plaintiff is referring to his status during his relationship with Uber, or simply 
after Uber ended the relationship. At the same time, Plaintiff alleges that he ‘accept[ed] Uber’s offer 
of employment,’ and that ‘Plaintiff has not received payment for all of the work performed during the 
period of employment.’ Given Plaintiff’s inconsistent allegations, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss with leave to amend so that Plaintiff may clearly—and concisely—allege the nature 
of his relationship with Uber.” Id. at *5. 
131. Id. at *5, *89 (internal quotations omitted).  
132. Alatraqchi, 2013 WL 4517756, at *5; see also Uber Driving Partner—A Great Part Time Opportunity, 
UBER (2019), https://get.uber.com/p/part-time-driving-partner/ [https://perma.cc/SN7Y-MR7V]. 
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grant leave to amend, but noted that at the present time it could not “supply 
essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”133 
These cases demonstrate the approach of certain courts on the issue of 
what must be pleaded to establish an employment relationship in the 
technology sector. As seen here, these courts have tended to require a high 
level of specificity in pleading these facts, rejecting conclusory (or 
conflicting) allegations. Indeed, as these cases illustrate, technology cases 
will not be allowed to proceed where the allegations fail to include 
detailed facts about the working relationship between employer and 
employee. And, by rigidly adhering to the Iqbal requirements, these courts 
have rejected generalized statements about whether an employment 
relationship has been established. Failure to sufficiently plead these facts, 
or to make consistent statements throughout the complaint, will result in 
dismissal of the claim. 
The early caselaw has thus suggested that platform-based pleadings 
should be consistent, specific, and detailed to survive dismissal. Plaintiffs 
bringing claims in the technology sector should make sure to satisfy this 
standard if they want to move their cases into discovery. 
B. Sufficient Pleadings 
Unlike the courts in Carter and Alatraqchi, several other courts have 
denied motions to dismiss in platform pleading cases.134 A close 
examination of these cases—where the courts have allowed the matters to 
proceed—will help to better illustrate the pleading requirements in this 
area. Generally speaking, these federal courts have applied a much more 
relaxed pleading standard from Iqbal and Twombly, forgoing the more 
rigid standard used by many other courts.135 
For example, in Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,136 the district court for 
the Northern District of California found that the Uber drivers in the case 
had “alleged sufficient facts to claim plausibly that an employment 
relationship exist[ed].”137 In reaching that result, the court noted that the 
allegations were sufficient to show that Uber sets the price of rides, 
controls driver routes, controls customer contact data, and maintains the 
                                                     
133. Alatraqchi, 2013 WL 4517756, at *4 (internal quotations omitted). 
134. See, e.g., Phillips v. Uber Techs., Inc., 16 Civ. 295 (DAB), 2017 WL 2782036, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 14, 2017) (finding it “premature at this point to make a finding based [on] the limited record 
before it,” but stating allegations “insufficient alone legally to establish control indicative of an 
employment relationship”). 
135. See supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court plausibility pleading standard). 
136. 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
137. Id. 
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power to fine drivers.138 The company further employs workers with no 
specialized skills on a frequent basis.139 The complaint also established 
that Uber controls the appearance of drivers, as well as the overall 
atmosphere experienced by the worker.140 In analyzing the case, the court 
fully considered the factors weighing both in favor of and against the 
creation of an employment relationship in the matter.141 
The court also looked to prior decisions on the employee/independent 
contractor issue involving Uber and Lyft.142 Considering the allegations 
and prior caselaw, the court held that even if there are facts “that disprove 
plaintiffs’ allegations or that tilt the scales toward a finding that Uber 
drivers are independent contractors[,] . . . plaintiffs have alleged 
sufficient facts that an employment relationship may plausibly exist.”143 
                                                     
138. “In support of this assertion, plaintiffs have alleged that Uber sets fare prices without driver 
input and that drivers may not negotiate fares. If a driver takes a circuitous route, Uber may modify 
the charges to the customer. Uber retains control over customer contact information.” Id. at 782 
(citations omitted) (citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 39, 40, 42, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774  (No. 3:15-
cv-4670-SI)). 
139. “Uber’s business model depends upon having a large pool of non-professional drivers. There 
are no apparent specialized skills needed to drive for Uber. Uber retains the right to terminate drivers 
at will.” Id. (citations omitted) (citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 25, 36–38, 53–66, 43, Doe, 184 F. 
Supp. 3d 774  (No. 3:15-cv-4670-SI)). 
140. “Uber also controls various aspects of the manner and means by which drivers may offer rides 
through the Uber App. Among these, plaintiffs have alleged that Uber requires drivers to accept all 
ride requests when logged into the App or face potential discipline . . . . Uber requires drivers to: dress 
professionally; send the customer who has ordered a ride a text message when the driver is 1–2 
minutes away from the pickup location; keep their radios either off or on ‘soft jazz or NPR’; open the 
door for the customer; and pick up the customer on the correct side of the street where the customer 
is standing.” Id. (citations omitted) (citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 44, 45, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 
774  (No. 3:15-cv-4670-SI)). 
141. “Certain factors, as alleged, support Uber’s assertion that drivers are independent contractors, 
though not enough to convert the question into a matter of law. These include that the drivers generally 
do not receive a salary but are paid by the ride and that the drivers supply their own cars and car 
insurance. Even these factors, however, are not necessarily dispositive. It matters not whether Uber’s 
licensing agreements label drivers as independent contractors, if their conduct suggests otherwise. Id. 
at 782–83 (first citing S.G. Borello and Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 
1989); then citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 40, 50–51, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (No. 3:15-cv-4670-
SI); then citing Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th at 1, 5 (2007) 
(“finding drivers for FedEx to be employees even where drivers supplied their own trucks and 
maintained their own car insurance”); then citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 47–48, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 
3d 774 (No. 3:15-cv-4670-SI) (“[A]lleging that in certain cities Uber drivers may receive a guaranteed 
minimum rate, ‘tantamount to a salary,’ and that in January 2016 Uber announced that drivers will 
have guaranteed earnings, thereby—in plaintiffs’ view—giving ‘Uber drivers 
everywhere . . . essentially guaranteed salaries . . . .’”); then citing Estrada, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 10–
11; and then citing Motion to Dismiss at 6–7, Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (No. 15-cv-04670 SI)). 
142. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 783. 
143. Id. 
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In a similar case, the District Court for the District of Columbia held 
that an assault victim of an Uber driver sufficiently alleged the worker’s 
employment status with the business when “a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that Uber exercised control over [him] in a manner evincing an 
employer-employee relationship.”144 The court examined each element of 
the District of Columbia’s five-factor test. In reaching its result, the court 
thus looked to a multi-factor control test that is utilized in the 
jurisdiction.145 The court here—just like in Doe—found the allegations 
sufficient to show that the defendant exerts control over fares, wages, and 
other terms of employment.146 And, like in Doe, the court also held that 
the allegation of these elements in the case was sufficient to survive 
dismissal.147 The court further noted that the company here controlled the 
day-to-day operation of workers,148 thus further creating a factual dispute 
in the case as to employment status.149 
In yet another jurisdiction to address the issue, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found an Uber driver’s complaint 
sufficient to establish an employment relationship because it articulated 
                                                     
144. Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2015). 
145. Id. at 231–32. 
146. “Uber screens new drivers, dictates the fares they may charge, and pays such drivers weekly. 
[Plaintiff] claims that ‘[u]pon threat of termination, Uber subjects its drivers to a host of specific 
requirements,’ including, inter alia, the use of the Uber app, standards for the cleanliness and 
mechanical functioning of their cars, rules regarding tipping, minimum timeframes and acceptance 
rates for ride requests, and display of the Uber logo. According to Plaintiff, these facts establish the 
first four factors of the aforementioned test. Search maintains that the fifth factor, whether Deresse’s 
work is part of Uber’s regular business, is satisfied by his allegation that ‘Uber is a car service’ for 
which Deresse was a driver.” See id. at 232 (first citing Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 7–12, 15, Search, 
128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257); then citing Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 12–13, 
Search, 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257 (JEB)); and then citing Amended Complaint at ¶ 6, 
Search, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257)). 
147. “The Court agrees, for the most part. The Amended Complaint sets forth facts illustrating 
Uber’s involvement in the selection process of new drivers (by way of its screening procedures); 
payment of wages (by paying drivers weekly rather than permitting them to collect payment or tips 
directly from passengers); and termination of employees (by enjoying broad latitude to terminate 
employees who fail to comply with the company’s standards). As to the question whether driving is 
Uber’s regular business, Defendant simply disagrees with Plaintiff’s factual allegation that the 
company is a ‘car service.’ It does not argue—for good reason—that even if Uber is a car service, as 
alleged, Deresse’s driving is not its regular work.” Id. at 232. 
148. “Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Uber controls the rate of refusal of ride requests, the timeliness 
of the drivers’ responses to requests, the display on vehicles of its logo, the frequency with which 
drivers may contact passengers, the drivers’ interactions with passengers (including how they accept 
tips and collect fares), and the quality of drivers via its rating system.” Id. at 233 (citing Amended 
Complaint at ¶¶ 15, 8, Search, 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (No. 1:15-cv-00257)). 
149. “Taking these allegations as true, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Uber exercised 
control over Deresse in a manner evincing an employer-employee relationship . . . in sum, the Court 
cannot determine as a matter of law that [the driver] was an independent contractor.” Id.  
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“several well-pleaded allegations.”150 The court in this case again looked 
to the critical element of control, stating that the defendants: 
“control the number of fares each driver receives,” “have 
authority to suspend or terminate a driver’s access to the App,” 
“are not permitted to ask for gratuity,” and “are subject to 
suspension or termination if they receive an unfavorable customer 
rating.” . . . [I]n order to serve as Drivers, “drivers must undergo 
[] training, testing, examination, a criminal background check and 
driving history check.”151 
The court also noted that there was factual support to demonstrate that 
Uber drivers are financially dependent on the company.152 
The court therefore outlined the specific facts plaintiffs had alleged 
which supported employment status under federal law.153 And, the court 
emphasized the drivers’ assertion that they were “dependent upon the 
business to which they render service,” looking to prior case law.154 Thus, 
the court concluded that, pursuant to federal law and prior precedent, the 
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled their employment status.155 
In sum, the federal courts have favored technology sector complaints 
brought in the employment context that have included detailed factual 
allegations supporting an employment relationship with the company. The 
courts have tended to allow these cases to proceed where the facts and 
allegations presented are more than generalizations. Where permitted to 
proceed, technology sector employment cases also avoid inconsistent 
allegations. And, the courts that have been willing to entertain these cases 
have taken a more liberal approach to the pleading standards than those 
courts discussed in the prior section.156 
Overall, then, the federal courts have accepted complaints in the 
technology sector that factually support allegations of an employment 
                                                     
150. Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2016 WL 5874822, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016). 
151. Id. 
152. “Plaintiffs also specifically allege that they are ‘dependent upon the business to which they 
render service.’” Id. at *4 (citing Complaint at ¶ 157, Razak, No. 16-573, 2016 WL 5874822 (No. 
2:16-CV-00573) (“Plaintiffs and Class members are financially dependent on the fare provided to 
them by Defendants.”); then citing Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1383 (3d 
Cir. 1985)); see also Razak, 2016 WL 7241795, at *5. 
153. Razak, 2016 WL 7241795, at *1–5. 
154. Razak, 2016 WL 5874822, at *4. 
155. Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 16-573, 2017 WL 4052417, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 
2017) (“Plaintiff’s allegations that they were Online the Uber App for more than 40 hours in a given 
week was sufficient—at the pleading stage—to state a claim for overtime pay under the FLSA.” 
(citing Razak, 2016 WL 7241795, at *6)). 
156. See supra section IV.A (discussing court decisions granting motion to dismiss on the question 
of the existence of an employment relationship in the technology sector). 
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relationship, avoid contradictory statements, and provide more than legal 
and factual generalizations. 
C. Avoiding the Plausibility Standard 
A third approach worth noting—of those courts that have addressed 
employment questions arising in the technology sector—has been for 
those courts to simply avoid the plausibility issue altogether. These courts 
have tended either to conclude that the question of the sufficiency of the 
allegations is pre-mature, or to find that the case should be permitted to 
proceed without further analysis. Some courts, then, have simply avoided 
applying the plausibility standard completely, showing that clear guidance 
in this area is badly needed. 
For example, in Bekele v. Lyft157 the District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts concluded that the Lyft drivers bringing the allegations 
were employees when considering the company’s motions to compel and 
dismiss.158 The court stated that while Lyft “classifies its drivers in 
Massachusetts as independent contractors,” “the complaint alleges” 
differently and the “Court will assume that [the plaintiff] is an employee 
for purposes of this motion.”159 The court looked further to prior precedent 
to find an employment relationship with the company, noting other ride-
sharing cases which had allowed the complaints to survive dismissal.160 
The court thus simply sidestepped the issue by deferring to the analysis 
and results of other courts in this area. 
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts also noted 
the “litigated position of Uber” in considering the sufficiency of an 
employment complaint brought against the company.161 The court pointed 
to cases in California, New York, and Pennsylvania to support this 
result.162 The court concluded that “[b]ased on the litigated position of 
Uber, then, plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim.”163 
                                                     
157. 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 303 (D. Mass. 2016). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 303 n.18. Some courts have rejected summary judgment in ride-sharing cases on the 
question of the existence of an employment relationship; see generally Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 
3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
161. Malden Transp., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 3d 264, 281 (D. Mass. 2017).  
162. Id. Many courts have not been persuaded by Uber’s claim that it lacks the control necessary 
over its drivers necessary to create an employment relationship. See generally Mumin v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 507, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2016 WL 
5874822, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016); O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. 
163. Malden Transp., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 281. 
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The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma also 
sidestepped the question of the existence of an employment relationship 
for workers at Uber.164 The court stated that it “does not address this 
dispute because even assuming defendant is John Doe’s employer, for the 
reasons set forth below, plaintiff has still failed to assert a cause of action 
that survives defendant’s motion to dismiss.”165 Like the other cases 
discussed here, this federal court also avoided squarely addressing the 
worker misclassification issue. 
In a similar state court decision, a superior court of Massachusetts 
concluded that a ride-sharing driver had sufficiently alleged an 
employment relationship under the Massachusetts Wage Act.166 The court 
stated that “in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the complaint 
[did] not fail to state a claim.”167 The court did note that, under 
Massachusetts law, “it is [Uber’s] burden to prove that [plaintiff] meets 
all three prongs of the independent contractor test; it is not [plaintiff’s] 
burden to plead that he does not.”168 
In sum, a third approach used by the courts when analyzing whether 
technology sector workers have been misclassified has been to sidestep 
the issue altogether. This is not a surprising approach, given the complex 
allegations often involved as well as the confusion surrounding the 
Twombly and Iqbal decisions, and the plausibility standard itself.169 
Several courts have thus decided not to address the issue at all. As detailed 
below, this Essay sets forth a proposed pleading standard for technology 
sector employment cases. By creating more certainty in the type of 
allegations and facts that would typically be expected in a technology 
sector employment case, this Essay provides more clarity in this area. 
With a greater level of certainty, the courts may be more willing to address 
these issues directly when they arise. Nonetheless, currently, many courts 
are simply choosing to avoid wading into the issue at all. The popularity 
of this approach illustrates the need for clear guidance in this  area. 
                                                     
164. Mazaheri v. Doe, No. CIV-14-225-M, 2014 WL 2155049, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Okla. May 
22,  2014). 
165. Id. 
166. Lavitman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SUCV201204490, 2015 WL 728187, at *5–6 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015). 
167. Id. at *6. 
168. Id.  
169. See supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court’s plausibility standard). 
 
17 - Seiner.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2019  10:55 AM 
2019] PLATFORM PLEADING 1973 
 
IV. DRAFTING THE COMPLAINT: A PROPOSED 
PLEADING  STANDARD 
After surveying the recent complaints and caselaw in this area, it is now 
appropriate to provide suggestions for drafting a complaint which 
plausibly pleads an employment relationship with a technology sector 
business. Given the confusion noted above—and even the willingness of 
some courts to completely avoid the issue altogether—a model pleading 
standard is needed to assist the courts and parties in analyzing this issue.170 
A successful pleading model should closely consider the existing 
caselaw where plaintiffs have been successful in establishing an 
employment relationship with a technology sector business. Looking to 
the Carter and Alatraqchi cases discussed above,171 we learn that 
technology sector workers must carefully articulate their factual 
allegations of employment status. Plaintiffs should avoid any reference to 
a “partnership,” or “business relationship,” or “independent worker” 
status. Instead, plaintiffs should identify themselves as “workers” or 
preferably as “employees.” And, plaintiffs must do more than simply 
allege conclusory terms, and should include specific facts supporting their 
employment status with the company. 
There can be no magic “template” to establish a satisfactory 
hypothetical complaint in this or any other area, but there are a number of 
general guideposts to use to enhance the likelihood of success of a 
particular claim in this sector. This Essay proposes a basic framework to 
help evaluate employment claims brought in the technology sector. 
The test set forth here is not meant to be exhaustive. Indeed, it is more 
of a descriptive summary of the factors the federal courts have already 
relied upon before letting a particular platform-type case proceed. Thus, 
the framework suggested below must be considered flexible, and each 
case must be evaluated on its own merits. 
Plaintiffs should thus strongly consider pleading the following 
elements of the proposed model:172 
(1) when individual works; 
(2) where individual works; 
(3) how often work occurs; 
(4) manner of work performed; 
                                                     
170. Cf. Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 32, at 1782 (“Thus, unions and other groups concerned with 
working conditions must seek alternative strategies. Nowhere is this need more pronounced than in 
the technology sector, where workers’ employment status remains in flux.”). 
171. See supra section IV.A (discussing cases in which the federal district courts have allowed 
technology-based employment cases to proceed past the dismissal stage). 
172. This model is based on the factors of the test for establishing the employment relationship 
suggested in Means & Seiner, supra note 113. 
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(5) pricing/cost information; and 
(6) any other factors related to control. 
Adequately pleading these six factors should sufficiently articulate an 
employment relationship that is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 
To the extent any details can be provided for each of these factors, they 
should be set out in the complaint itself. While the pleadings need not be 
lengthy, they should be sufficient to overcome the plausibility standard of 
Twombly and Iqbal.173 It is important to note that no single factor will be 
dispositive in this test. Nor is any factor necessarily weighed more heavily 
than another. Rather, the court will look to the totality of these factors to 
determine whether an employment relationship exists. This test aims for 
simplicity, as well as effectiveness in practice. An outline more fully 
developing each of these factors is discussed below as well as an excellent 
example of a complaint in this area. 
A. When Work Performed 
The plaintiff should allege any facts supporting when the work was 
performed. The exact timing of the performance of one’s job goes directly 
to the factors discussed by the Supreme Court in Darden.174 When the 
performance of work occurs can greatly impact the nature of the job. 
When one’s work is performed also raises the question of the level of 
control in the employment relationship.175 Independent contractors tend to 
set their own hours whereas employees work when required by the 
business. The platform economy has put this question into flux, however, 
as employers may encourage workers to perform their tasks during certain 
peak periods, though they may not necessarily require the work to be 
performed during this time.176 
                                                     
173. See supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court plausibility standard). 
174. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (discussing agency 
principles and setting forth elements of the control test). 
175. See id. at 323 (including “the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to 
work” as elements suggesting control). 
176. See Maya Kosoff, Stop Complaining About Uber’s Surge Pricing, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 1, 
2015),   https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-surge-pricing-on-new-years-eve-2015-10 
[https://perma.cc/QG4R-7CMN] (“Surge pricing happens when there’s a high demand for Uber 
vehicles in a particular area. During times of high demand—on weekend nights, on holidays, or during 
bad weather—Uber enacts surge pricing, which charges a multiplier on every fare during busy times. 
Uber says that by raising its prices, it encourages its supply—drivers—to get out on the road to keep 
up with increased demand.”). 
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B. Where Work Performed 
Plaintiffs should also allege any facts related to where the work was 
performed. The exact location where one performs the job can 
substantially impact the nature of the work. Whether one performs their 
work primarily in an office building, in a car, or in a customer’s home, the 
exact location of where the work duties are performed will go directly to 
the question of control.177 Where an employer has more oversight over a 
worker, and exercises more supervision over day-to-day activities, the 
more likely it is that an employment relationship will be created.178 
Supervision can occur in many ways, however, and a supervisor need not 
physically oversee a worker to exercise control over a 
particular  relationship.179 
C. How Often Work Occurs 
Plaintiffs should further assert in the complaint how often the work 
occurs. This is a critical inquiry in the technology sector. Many workers 
in the platform economy will use the particular job as a way to supplement 
their primary income from another source. It is thus important to allege 
whether the employment is part time in nature or whether it should be 
considered more of a full-time job. Where a worker spends fifty to sixty 
hours a week working for a particular employer, that employer will have 
far more control over that particular relationship. And such an employee 
would be far more likely to satisfy the control test articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Darden.180 
D. Manner of Work 
The plaintiff should further set forth clearly in the complaint the 
manner in which work is being performed in the technology sector. This 
                                                     
177. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (including “the location of the work” as a consideration in 
the control test). 
178. See generally id. 
179. Cf. Carlson, supra note 8, at 340–41 (“One might measure control, as the courts always have, 
by looking to an employer’s direct supervision over and express instructions to the worker in the 
performance of his work . . . . But does it follow that the absence of supervision and express 
instructions should indicate independent contractor status? A lack of direct supervision . . . might be 
due to [other factors such as] . . . the employer’s trust in the worker, earned by many years of 
experience and good work.”). 
180. See id. at 299, 340–41 (including “how long” an individual works as a consideration of 
control). As paragraphs twenty-eight and thirty-two in the model Bradshaw complaint set forth in 
Appendix A (and discussed infra) show, the plaintiff in that case expressly stated that Mr. Bradshaw 
worked between thirty and sixty hours per week for the ridesharing company. See infra app. A.  
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is critical as this emerging industry presents many opportunities for 
employment that have never before existed.181 Some federal courts may 
be unfamiliar with certain jobs that exist in the platform economy, and a 
concise and accurate description of the type of work being performed is 
critical for the complaint. The manner of the work performed goes 
specifically to the control question as well.182 How the job is done, 
including the specific requirements imposed by the company, 
demonstrates how much supervision is involved in the worker’s day-to-
day activities. 
E. Pricing/Cost Information 
The pricing model is an often forgotten—yet critical—aspect of the 
employment relationship. How the pricing is set reveals much about 
whether a worker is seen as an employee. Independent contractors set their 
own pricing (and often their own hours). Employees, however, rely on the 
business to establish what rate customers will pay.183 Again, these are 
general guidelines developed over time. A house contractor will typically 
provide a quote to a customer based on their own experience and skill set, 
whereas an employee at McDonald’s will allow the business to establish 
the prices paid for particular menu items. These examples are obviously 
at the extremes, however, and again the platform economy creates some 
uncertainty in this area.184 Nonetheless, pricing is an important factor to 
examine and often reveals where the true control exists in the working 
relationship between the business and individual performing the job. 
F. Any Other Factors Related to Control 
As clearly discussed throughout this Essay, the platform-based 
economy is new, still emerging, and evolving in many ways. The industry 
itself places a high value on new ideas and different ways to reach 
customers and potential clients. It is impossible to fashion a test here that 
would be directly applicable to every company in the technology industry, 
                                                     
181. See generally Seiner, Tailoring Class Actions, supra note 11 (discussing the importance of the 
manner in which work is being performed in determining the existence of an employment relationship 
in technology sector cases). 
182. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (discussing control factors for employment). 
183. Means & Seiner, supra note 113 (discussing the importance of pricing models in evaluating 
employment status in the on-demand economy). 
184. See Heather Somerville, True Price of an Uber Ride in Question as Investors Assess Firm’s Value, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/newswires/news/business/true-price-uber-ride-
question-investors-assess-firm-article-1.3435439 [https://perma.cc/8JFB-4NLZ] (“The new [Uber pricing] 
system also uses an algorithm to better price rides to minimize losses.”). 
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as well as one that would capture future businesses in this area. Indeed, 
there can be little doubt that the sector will look far different in five years 
from how it appears today. Thus, the factors set forth here are important 
guidelines for establishing where control lies in the working 
relationship,185 but the proposed model does not purport to be an all-
inclusive test. It is therefore important to have some type of catch-all 
provision that would allow plaintiffs to assert certain other facts specific 
to their employment relationship that are suggestive of control.186 These 
factors could represent any information that would further help a court to 
determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. 
Perhaps more importantly, this final factor is a reminder to plaintiffs to 
take a step back and look more holistically at the facts of the case to 
determine if there are any other elements that should be alleged. In the 
face of Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must look beyond conclusory 
allegations to more broadly represent early on the nature of the 
employment relationship and any supporting facts.187 Thus, as no test is 
all inclusive, plaintiffs should consider alleging other facts and should be 
encouraged to assert any information in the case which suggests that the 
employer has more control in the working relationship. 
In summary, plaintiffs should plead as many supporting facts as 
possible in a technology sector complaint. They should outline facts 
specific to their working experience which help support the business’s 
control over the working relationship. They should be as concise as 
possible, avoiding any “contradictory” statements in establishing 
the  claim.188 
                                                     
185. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 339 (“What is it, then, that distinguishes employer control over 
employees from employer control over independent contractors? The answer of the courts has been 
that an employer controls the details of an employee’s work, but only the results of a contractors 
work.”). 
186. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (discussing agency principles and control factors 
for  employment). 
187. See supra Part III (discussing the plausibility test developed in Supreme Court caselaw). 
Beyond establishing the elements of the employment test, however, plaintiffs should make sure to 
satisfy the other requirements of the claim. They should thus make sure to provide facts supporting 
the argument that a violation of an employment statute has occurred—whether under federal or state 
law. This analysis is well beyond the scope of this Essay, which is limited to the question of analyzing 
the existence of an employment relationship in the technology sector—not whether a violation of the 
law itself has occurred. 
188. See supra section IV.B (discussing lower courts’ dissatisfaction with contradictory statements 
in technology sector complaints). 
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G. The Bradshaw Complaint—An Illustrative example 
The model proposed here may be a bit abstract, and it can be helpful to 
examine an actual technology sector pleading that implicates a worker’s 
employment status. In Bradshaw v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,189 the 
ridesharing company did not argue that the plaintiffs had insufficiently 
pled their employment relationship with the business.190 The federal 
district court noted that: 
[i]n the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants do not 
take issue with Plaintiff’s pleading sufficient facts to establish that 
they were his employer for purposes of [federal wage/hour law]. 
Defendants contend, however, that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient 
facts to support his contention that he was paid less than the statutory 
minimum wage or that he was entitled to overtime pay.191 
The detailed nature of this complaint helped the worker in this case to 
establish an employment relationship with Uber. Thus, the Bradshaw 
complaint includes highly detailed factual allegations that are set forth in 
Appendix A. This detailed complaint alleges general facts supporting the 
workers’ employment status and specific facts setting forth the plaintiff’s 
individual experience with Uber.192 
Technology sector workers should examine the Bradshaw complaint 
when drafting their own pleadings in a similar case. The ideal allegations 
would plead not only general facts concerning the business’s relationship 
with workers, but it should further state facts supporting the individual’s 
relationship with the company. Additionally, the ideal complaint would 
frame these facts in the context of the proposed framework set forth in this 
Essay, using the elements set forth as a guide to including all of the 
relevant facts. While the Bradshaw complaint does not perfectly model 
the approach suggested here, it is nonetheless an excellent example of the 
type of detailed pleadings sufficient to allege an employment relationship 
in the technology sector. While not perfect, then, the attached complaint 
is currently the best attempt by a plaintiff to demonstrate that such a 
working relationship exists in a platform-based business. It thus provides 
a nice template—combined with the proposed framework set forth here—
for technology sector workers to consider when preparing a complaint in 
this area. 
                                                     
189. No. CIV-16-388-R, 2017 WL 2455151, at *8 (W.D. Okla. June 6, 2017). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. For the purpose of brevity, this section does not include all of the facts alleged in the Bradshaw 
complaint. Rather, this detailed complaint is attached in Appendix A. Infra app. A. Again, while the 
Bradshaw complaint does not identically mirror the factors set forth in the proposed framework, it is 
one of the closest examples of such an ideal pleading for platform based employment. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD 
This Essay has examined many of the current cases in the federal courts 
analyzing who is an employee in technology-based cases. Synthesizing 
this case law, this Essay proposes an analytical framework for pleading 
these technology sector claims. As noted throughout this Essay, this 
approach is not intended to be exhaustive and should serve merely as a 
guideline for approaching these types of claims. As with any framework, 
there are a number of benefits and drawbacks to analyzing cases under a 
more fixed approach. It is worth highlighting some of those implications 
here, but it is also important to note that this test should never be applied 
in an overly rigid way. Indeed, the test itself specifically incorporates 
flexibility into the factors enumerated.193 And, as seen in the Bradshaw 
complaint attached here, there may be many ways to successfully plead a 
case outside of (or in conjunction with) the proposed model. 
Perhaps the greatest benefit of the framework proposed here is the 
ability it provides the courts to better understand whether there are any 
shortfalls in a particular claim. As demonstrated in the cases above, the 
courts have taken highly varied approaches with respect to analyzing these 
types of technology sector cases. The courts have been openly frustrated 
with the lack of guidance they have been given in this area, struggling to 
fit the square peg of the evolving modern economy into the round hole of 
existing—and outdated—caselaw and legislation.194 The approach 
suggested here gives the courts a template from which to work and to 
examine the types of factors necessary to establish an employment 
relationship in a platform based claim. The courts can thus compare the 
facts of the case before them against the framework proposed here in 
determining whether a complaint is sufficient to proceed. The approach 
proposed here specifically incorporates and navigates the Supreme Court 
plausibility caselaw, and further considers the recent platform-based 
decisions of the federal district courts. Thus, this framework provides an 
updated examination of the pleading requirements necessary for litigants 
to be permitted to proceed in the technology field. The courts, while 
understandably confused when considering these claims, will now have 
better guidance when undertaking this endeavor. 
Similarly, this test assists both defendants and plaintiffs to better 
understand, evaluate and frame litigation in this area. Plaintiffs will have 
                                                     
193. See supra Part V (noting importance of taking holistic approach to pleading elements of 
control in technology sector workplace case). 
194. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (determining who is an 
employee in the technology sector is like being “handed a square peg and asked to choose between 
two round holes”). 
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a template to use to help explore what facts to highlight in their claims. 
The test proposed here thus allows plaintiffs to work from a framework in 
setting forth the necessary elements for creating an employment 
relationship in the technology sector. Previously, plaintiffs were left with 
the general guidance provided in the Supreme Court’s Darden decision of 
control and its many possible elements.195 This framework has simply not 
been updated to reflect the evolving modern economy. The test proposed here 
attempts to do just that, incorporating the reality of platform-based work with 
the traditional test for control and common law agency principles.196 
In the same way, defendants can determine if there are any shortfalls in 
the case, and the proposed factors quickly establish what arguments can 
be made with respect to the lack of any employment relationship. 
Defendants can thus use the framework to quickly determine whether the 
workers involved in a platform-based claim are employees or independent 
contractors. Where an employment relationship does not appear to have 
been created, defendants can move to dismiss the claim. 
The test proposed here would also bring greater certainty to this area of 
the law.197 Given the confusion which currently exists, some general 
guidelines are long overdue. Through more certainty in this area, the 
likelihood that technology-based cases will settle is greatly enhanced.198 
This has the additional benefit of reducing the amount of litigation in the area, 
benefiting both parties as well as the judiciary. More certainty and more 
settled law in a particular field inherently leads to greater settlement 
numbers.199 Reduced litigation financially benefits all parties and allows the 
courts to focus more closely on those claims where true legal disputes exist. 
Working from a common framework, this model also allows plaintiffs 
to better streamline their allegations. Rather than throwing everything at 
a complaint to see what sticks, plaintiffs will have a standard model to 
help better focus their claims. More streamlined, straightforward 
                                                     
195. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (discussing agency 
principles and control factors for employment). 
196. See supra Part V (discussing the Darden control factors in the context of technology 
sector  workers). 
197. Where there is greater certainty in the law, there can be additional comfort given to potential 
startups in the technology industry. The uncertainty surrounding state and federal employment laws 
can undoubtedly act as a barrier for many aspiring technology businesses. Where the rules are more 
clearly established, potential businesses will be much better able to assess the potential risk, and 
benefits, of incorporating. 
198. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Commonality and the Constitution: A Framework for Federal and 
State Court Class Actions, 91 IND. L.J. 455, 490 (2016) (addressing the benefits of certainty in the 
legal system); Stewart, supra note 34, at 662 (“The more certain the law—the less variance in 
expected outcomes—the more likely the parties will predict the same outcome from litigation, and 
the less likely litigation will occur because of differences in predicted outcomes.”).  
199. See Seiner, supra note 198, at 490; Stewart, supra note 34, at 662. 
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complaints will allow cases to move forward much more quickly and 
more readily provide notice to defendants of the allegations against them. 
And, through this analytical framework, plaintiffs will much more easily 
be able to identify and assert the factors necessary to establish the 
existence of an employment relationship. 
Though the model suggested here would lead to many efficiencies for 
plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts, there are nonetheless certain 
drawbacks. Perhaps the greatest concern raised by the use of this test 
would be that the courts would apply it too rigidly. As seen in the federal 
court decisions issued shortly after the creation of the plausibility standard 
in Twombly, many of the federal courts—particularly in the civil rights 
context—used the new standard to heighten the pleading bar and dismiss 
otherwise legitimate claims.200 With any test, then, the possibility exists 
for the courts to use a given standard as a reason to dismiss a particular 
claim. Some courts may thus consider the proposed standard to create a 
heightened bar, and not apply it with the flexibility that was intended. 
Though the concern certainly exists that the courts would apply the 
proposed framework too rigidly, the same courts would likely find other 
reasons to dismiss the case even in the absence of the standard 
suggested  here. 
Similarly, given the evolving modern economy, there can be no one-
size-fits-all approach. It is entirely possible that many claims will arise 
where this model is simply insufficient or does not work for the particular 
case. It is impossible to envision all of the platform-based cases that can 
arise, or how technology companies may evolve in the future.201 The 
courts and litigants must be careful, then, to consider this test simply as a 
broad guideline. It is not a standard of proof, and there are likely to be 
situations where the elements do not fit the facts of the particular case. 
Additionally, caution should be used when attempting to apply the factors 
proposed here to the more traditional brick-and-mortar type employment 
relationships. While the factors would still be relevant in those types of 
situations, the test proposed here was created with technology sector 
claims specifically in mind. 
Finally, given the number of factors proposed above, there is also a 
danger that plaintiffs will attempt to over-plead their claims. Alleging all 
of the factors could enhance the pure size of many complaints, which 
                                                     
200. See supra Part III (discussing rigid application of the Supreme Court’s plausibility standard 
in the employment and civil rights contexts). 
201. See, e.g., Forbes Tech. Council, Upcoming Technology, Ten Trends to Watch in the Next Five 
Years,  FORBES (Dec. 27, 2016),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2016/12/27/upco
ming-technology-10-trends-to-watch-in-the-next-five-years/#210c260e2fd1 
[https://perma.cc/G6Q4-WQW5] (examining changes that may occur in the gig sector). Similarly, it 
is impossible to predict what technology-based jobs will even look like in the  future. 
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would lead to some long-winded claims that would be difficult for the 
courts to assess. Given the number of elements proposed above, it is 
therefore fair to have some level of concern that the proposed test will 
lead to lengthy complaints that are too large and cumbersome. While this 
is certainly a possibility that should be acknowledged, by analyzing more 
precise elements targeted specifically at the exact question at issue, 
plaintiffs are more likely to focus in on the relevant factors of a case. 
While there is no way to completely prevent inartful pleading, in practice, 
litigants will be able to use the elements of the proposed framework to 
prepare a more streamlined, concise complaint that identifies the critical 
areas at issue. 
No test is perfect. And any proposed standard certainly comes with 
some risk. At the end of the day, however, given the level of frustration 
and confusion in this area, some guidance is undoubtedly necessary for 
pleading platform-based claims. This guidance should be applied in a 
flexible manner, and the test proposed above attempts to capture the many 
different factual scenarios that could exist in a technology-based case. The 
test is specifically targeted at identifying whether a worker is an 
employee, and it attempts to weed out those claims where only 
independent contractors are involved.202 The test proposed here provides 
definitive judicial efficiencies, should lead to more focused, careful 
litigation, and allows the courts to focus on those cases where litigation of 
the facts and law is necessary. With almost all litigants currently confused 
as to how to properly evaluate a complaint in this area,203 more certainty 
in this field of the law is needed. The framework proposed here provides 
that certainty. This Essay also seeks to foster further debate on the topic, 
as well as additional discussion of the requirements necessary for 
technology sector workers to sufficiently allege an 
employment  relationship. 
                                                     
202. It is worth emphasizing that the analytical framework proposed here only attempts to answer 
the question of whether there is sufficient evidence in a technology sector case to create the existence 
of an employment relationship. The model was not intended to apply to the more traditional brick-
and-mortar employment relationships. Similarly, the test does not attempt to address the more 
complex question of whether there is an actual violation of a state or federal employment law. Rather, 
the proposed-framework only seeks to answer the more basic question of whether the worker in the 
platform based case satisfies the definition of being an employee. See generally, Joseph A. Seiner, 
Understanding the Unrest of France’s Younger Workers: The Price of American Ambivalence, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1053, 1077–78 (2006) (discussing the requirements to bring an employment 
discrimination claim).  
203. See supra Part IV (discussing different approaches of litigants and the courts to analyzing the 
employment issue in the technology sector). 
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CONCLUSION 
As this Essay demonstrates, there is widespread confusion and 
conflicting federal court opinions on the question of worker classification 
in the technology sector. The courts have always struggled with defining 
the employment relationship, and the new platform-based jobs in the 
modern economy have only complicated this inquiry. As this Essay 
shows, the federal courts have issued varied opinions on the issue of 
worker classification in the platform economy. The need for guidance in 
this area has never been greater, and this Essay attempts to provide some 
fundamental ground rules for litigating in this field. No model is perfect, 
and no framework can capture every factual scenario in this evolving 
industry. The guidance proposed here, however, provides some clarity to 
an otherwise confused area of the law. The law must adapt and evolve 
with the changing economy, and new rules are needed to define 
employment outside of the traditional brick-and-mortar working 
relationship. Looking to the realities of technology sector work, this 
Essay—for the first time—attempts to provide this new definition. 
Hopefully, this Essay will spark a dialogue as to how employment should 
be characterized in this new economy and how we can help better secure 
the federal and state workplace protections that are now at risk for many 
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Appendix A: 
Selected Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint in Bradshaw v. Uber 
Technologies204  
 
2. Uber, a company valued at more than $50 billion, has and 
continues to take unfair advantage of its financially struggling 
Uber Drivers by terming them “Independent Transportation 
Providers.”205 Only in the counterfactual world could Uber 
Drivers be considered “independent.”206 Uber Drivers lack 
discretion in the performance of their employment relationship 
with Uber, and have no independence apart from Uber in 
performing their employment with Uber.207 
3. Uber Drivers are able to secure fares only through Uber’s 
mobile application, which governs every aspect of Uber Drivers’ 
transportation services for Uber.208 When Uber restricts a Driver’s 
access to Uber’s mobile application, Uber effectively terminates 
the Driver, as the Driver is unable to work for Uber or Uber’s 
users. Uber’s misclassification of its Drivers as non-employees of 
the company has resulted in Uber Drivers’ inability to earn 
minimum wage.209 
4. Plaintiff alleges that he and other Uber Drivers are employees, 
and as employees, are entitled to basic wage protections such as 
expense reimbursement, overtime pay, rest- and meal-breaks, and 
other benefits that attach to employees that do not likewise attach 
to independent contractors.210 Uber misclassifies its drivers as 
independent contractors to evade these and other protections of 
Oklahoma law as well as the Fair Labor Standards Act.211 
5. Moreover, Uber intentionally misrepresents to the public how 
it compensates its Drivers so that it can retain a disproportionate 
                                                     
204. Complaint, Bradshaw v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CIV-16-388-R, 2017 WL 2455151 (W.D. 
Okla. June 6, 2017).  
205. Id. at 1.   
206. Id.   
207. Id.   
208. Id. at 2.  
209. Id.   
210. Id.    
211. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).     
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percentage of the fares generated by Uber Drivers.212 Uber 
markets its rides as gratuity-included, but Uber does not remit the 
gratuity (or an amount in-kind) to Uber Drivers.213 Uber 
effectively takes the tips.214 To worsen the reality for these 
Drivers, Plaintiff and members of the putative class finance all 
expenses related to their employment with Uber (e.g., gas, cost of 
insurance, deductibles, and vehicle maintenance, 
among  others).215 
18. Defendants employ(ed) Plaintiff and members of the Class, 
exercised control over their wages, their hours, and their 
working  conditions.216 
19. Defendants regulate every aspect of Uber Drivers’ 
job  performance.217 
20. As with other employers, Defendants required Plaintiff and 
Uber Drivers to submit to background checks, and to disclose 
banking information and residence, as well as social 
security  numbers.218 
21. Uber requires Plaintiff and Uber Drivers to register their cars 
with Uber and the vehicles cannot be more than ten years old.219 
22. Uber Drivers do not pay Defendants to use Defendants’ 
intellectual property, the mobile application. Uber Drivers do not, 
in the strictest sense, pay Uber a fee as consideration for use of 
Uber’s mobile application.220 
23. Rather, Defendants compensate their Uber Drivers based 
upon the employment arrangement that Uber unilaterally imposes 
upon its Drivers, as with any employment-based 
business  model.221 
                                                     
212. Id.    
213. Id.    
214. Id. at 2–3.   
215. Id.  
216. Id. at 6.  
217. Id.  
218. Id.   
219. Id.   
220. Id.   
221. Id.   
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24. Uber Drivers are not engaged in a business distinct from 
Uber’s business.222 The Uber application ensures this.223 Through 
the application, Uber controls and directly manages Uber’s entire 
transportation service, critically, inclusive of its Drivers.224 
25. Plaintiff’s and Uber Drivers’ ability to earn income depends 
solely on Uber and not in any way on an Uber Driver’s particular 
skill or acumen, or on any managerial or other discretionary job 
skill.225 
     After these general allegations about Uber drivers, the Bradshaw 
plaintiff included specific facts about his personal work relationship 
with Uber: 
26. Plaintiff is a retired Oklahoma State Trooper.226 
27. In February of 2014, Plaintiff began working for UberX. He 
is still currently employed as an Uber Driver.227 
28. On average, Plaintiff drives thirty (30) hours each week and 
Uber compensates him on a weekly basis.228 
29. In 2015, Plaintiff drove 40,000 miles.229 He grossed 
$23,872.00, but after paying his employment related expenses, 
which using the federal rate of 57.5¢ per mile, were $23,000, 
Plaintiff netted only $872.00 for the year, even though he worked 
1,500 hours that year.230 In other words, he made just 58 cents per 
hour.231 In addition, the $23,000 for expenses did not include car 
washes, which cost him $300 per year, as well as satellite radio, 
which cost him $200 per year.23231. When Plaintiff first started, 
after Uber retained its portion of the fare but before paying his 
employment related expenses, Plaintiff earned between $500 and 
                                                     
222. Id. at 7.  
223. Id.   
224. Id.   
225. Id.   
226. Id.   
227. Id.   
228. Id.   
229. Id.   
230. Id.   
231. Id.   
232. Id.   
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$600 per week.233 Plaintiff’s expenses, including gas, insurance, 
lease payments, and car repairs, were approximately 30% of any 
amount earned ($150 to $180 each week).234 
32. For some time during his employment, Mr. Bradshaw worked 
in excess of 50 to 60 hours a week.235 At all times, Uber failed to 
pay overtime compensation.236 
33. The terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment have 
changed drastically since he first was hired by Uber.237 The 
changes were instituted by Uber, without any input from Plaintiff 
or other drivers.238 
34. Initially, Plaintiff and other drivers earned $1.50 per mile.239 
Now, he and other Uber Drivers earn only .70¢ per mile.240 
Throughout his employment, Plaintiff has been subject to several 
price reductions implemented at the sole discretion of Uber.241 
 
                                                     
233. Id. at 7–8.  
234. Id. at 8.   
235. Id.    
236. Id.   
237. Id.   
238. Id.   
239. Id.   
240. Id.   
241. Id.   
